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Phenomenology, Theology and Psychosis:
Towards Compassion
My aim in this article is to initiate reflection upon psychosis by way of
phenomenology and theology. From the basis of phenomenology and theology, I wish
to present a new perspective that may help to understand the nature and experience of
psychosis.

My approach will be especially, but not wholly, influenced by the

philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas (1905-1995), whose writings in recent times have
been of great interest for Christian theologians.1 Particularly, I have set out to develop
several ideas of his earlier work, Existence and Existents, and of his latter work,
Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence.2

Accordingly, whilst there will be

similarities between my writing and Levinas’, there will also be a necessary departure
as my own thought becomes evident. But, for the purpose of clarity, let us look briefly
at Levinas’ post-phenomenology and its possible connection to the study of mental
health.

Levinas’ development of metaphysics beyond the thought of Edmund Husserl, Martin
Heidegger and Franz Rosenzweig has proved to be of special interest, especially in the
domains of ethics and theology.3 But I believe this can be extended to mental health.
After all, Levinas’ thought goes beyond the intentionalilty of consciousness to a nonintentionality, that is, to a pre-reflective consciousness.

Hence, the act of

consciousness must not be objectified within reality and existence. He will thus focus
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upon two extremes: (i) an anonymous and depersonalised consciousness (in his earlier
works)4 and (ii) a passive consciousness that takes a variety of forms: fearing for the
Other; a moral conscience; and as ethical transcendence (especially in his latter
works).5

In a later writing, he will indicate that there will be times where a ‘possible confusion’
might exist between the two, namely between alterity (ethical responsibility for the
Other) and a depersonalised existence (the ‘stirring of the there is [il y a]’).6 But the
idea here is to evoke both a sense of comedy and tragedy. On the one hand, the point
is this: behind the present comic dimension where the moral self puts his or her
conscience into question is the absent (in the sense of being absent from
consciousness) tragic dimension that shocks the human soul and inverts it from selfinterest to disinterestedness (alterity/otherness). As a result, the subject is frightened
out of its spectatorial attitude, producing a course of action in union with the Absolute
Good. Such responsibility is not the product of theoretical consciousness, but is due to
an extreme passivity of responsibility. On the other hand, the confusion also indicates
the overwhelming presence of a depersonalised existence. Here, there is no logical
thought: the depersonalised existence is confused as an absence of evil and hence, as
an illusion of the good. And it is this last point from which I want to begin my
description and analysis of psychosis.

My aim is to pierce open the experience of psychosis. I will speak of death, horror, the
emotions, existence and reality (qualities of Being), states of altered existence and of
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grief, persecution, humiliation, exposure, mercy and compassion.

My focus will

appear very phenomenological, but as the article progresses, I will introduce some
theology to emphasise the face of the suffering Other is the place and time of the
encounter with the word of God.

But firstly, we will approach psychosis as an

existence cut off from reality. In such horror, fear is the dominant emotion and
becomes so suffocating that it takes the form of an idol. As a result, the self is turned
inside out by being removed of subjectivity. It exists in an anonymous vigilance
towards the idol or ‘thing’.7 In this regard, death seems impossible. Furthermore, in
the everyday world delusions and fears take on the role of hiding the possibility of
death. In a sense, the self exists as a trace of a (effaced) past, that is, a past devoid of
hope and life.

Following on from our analysis of existence and reality, we will look at three states of
altered existence, namely, idolisation, ethical escapism, and terrifying and enthralling
transcendence. John Caruana, in his analysis of ‘Lévinas’ Critique of the Sacred’, has
pointed to these ‘states of mind’.8 While his aim is more to explain, prove and bring
out Levinas’ understanding of the sacred, I will try to show that the world of psychosis
is one that parallels the Levinasian criticisms of the language of ontology and its
associated categories of objectivity, presence and Being. We do not merely want to
use ontology to describe psychosis. Rather, the argument is this: the character of the
language of ontology itself holds insights into the experience of psychosis.
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Levinas has challenged both the quest for the meaning of Being and the primacy of lived
experience. This is to say that his philosophy puts into question the attempt to use
ontological language with the categories of objectivity, presence and Being. However,
the very way in which he speaks of the contamination of ontology particularly in
theology signifies that ontological language itself can offer some insight into psychosis.
For Levinas, the idea of ‘Being’ contaminates the mystery of God.9 The experience of
Being is perhaps a catastrophe for the encounter of God. It is a catastrophe because
Being’s truth reflects more a servitude to self-interest rather than the quality of God ‘as
such’. Even though Levinasian thought advocates a language of otherness, his criticisms
of ontology should not be neglected as they contain starting points in themselves for
reflection.

Levinas’ thought directs our attention to the person and in particular to the face rather
than ontological theories and problems.

This suggests that the language of alterity

(otherness) could also be very useful to understand psychosis. However, we should not
understand such a language as an answer or a cure for psychosis, but more as a response
that can bring about a space and a time for compassion, understanding and having a heart.
In a Levinasian sense, alterity or otherness identifies the personal encounter with the
Other rather than one’s own personal experience and objectivity as what truly defines
consciousness. As a result, the self is obliged to sacrifice for the Other to the point of
expiation.
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In order to appreciate and utilise Levinas’ thought, we cannot ignore what he means when
speaking of responsibility for the Other beyond the categories of objectivity, presence and
Being. Let us look briefly at Levinas’ conception of these categories. Levinas defines
objectivity as ‘Being’s essence [the event of Being] revealed in truth’.10

In short,

objectivity is knowledge11 without being the fruit of any relational personhood.
Accordingly, as Being is tied to an egoistical, all-knowing and all-consuming
consciousness, let us call this the totality of objectivity. Levinas argues that such
objectivity in consciousness distorts truth.12 The distortion occurs when consciousness is
reduced to a totalising presence - perhaps like an ideological or utopian economic model
for society that obscures the event of God’s self-communication to us. As a result, the
objectivity (totality) of Being absorbs, encloses and depersonalises the subject’s dreams,
hopes and even desire to serve the neighbour.13 In a sense, the reality of knowledge,
whether it is imagined, delusional or even logical, is so overwhelming and commanding
that it suppresses an other-centred existence. This suggests that subjectivity, the
personhood of relating with others, is subordinated to objective propositions of
experience which we find in egoisms struggling with others in the search for
intelligibility.14 This gives subjectivity a transcendental status rather than a substantive
one; subjectivity is subordinated to totality of the event of Being/care for oneself.
Furthermore, such totality results in a dark presence, ‘the fact-of-Being’, in which the ego
reduces its subjectivity with others to its own cold world of judgments, experiences and
representations.15

In this context, presence is that which encompasses, absorbs and

encloses things and consciousness.16 It is not surprising that Levinas can speak of this as
‘the horror of the night’.17
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We can note that the categories of objectivity, presence and Being play an integral part in
the language of ontology. Objectivity can indicate the dominating power of deluding
knowledge. Presence draws upon such knowledge to the illusion of determining the
meaning of Being or one’s reality in the world. This seems to suggest the light of Being
is in fact a dark horror in which fear and anxiety are the dominant emotions. Ontology
gives us no way out of delusions and the horror that grips a contaminated and
catastrophic reality. But the character of the language nevertheless serves to parallel the
three states of existence, idolisation, ethical escapism, and terrifying and enthralling
transcendence.

After considering these states, we will come to the final task of

suggesting that the poor one in our midst should not just be objectified as ‘psychotic’.
For example, to merely give objective interpretations that he or she is “schizophrenic’
will not help. But we want to argue that the face rather than the interpretation is the locus
for a compassionate encounter, above all an encounter in which the word of God might
be heard. Accordingly, I will suggest a radical, compassionate and expiating way of
responding to the fears, outrage and pain of the suffering Other. But let us first begin
with a look at existence and reality as a means to first pierce open the experience of
psychosis.

EXISTENCE AND REALITY
In the world of communication, we are often taken over by language. We use discourse
and reason to make sense of the world. We desire to discover truth whilst indeed trying
to escape from it. We search to understand reality through language, meaning and
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reason.

However, there are times when a word of reason is too present and too

overwhelming. This is because we can never totally conceive the meaning of our own
existence and reality; we remain at most a partial and momentary presence to ourselves.
In our attempts to search for meaning and truth, our articulations may become distorted,
unreal and imaginary. None the less, whether or not language or thinking is insightful or
illusionary, it is a way in which we express our consciousness and its associated
emotions.

In our search for reason, language might also become impersonal and objectified. As a
result, it takes a destructive and depersonalising turn to the extent of becoming lost in a
cold horror of objectivity. We often might touch upon this experience when the horror of
life is so much that we dare not enter into our own selves. There is something in us that
leads to fear of being personal or subjective.

This fear is an anonymous and

depersonalising presence of objective reality, knowledge and reason.

Such fear or

presence is anonymous because it is too horrible. It is also depersonalising in so far as it
destroys subjectivity and the ability to relate with others. Hence, it is not surprising that
the self, fearful of the world, might become lost in darkness and chaos. This is a presence
dividing the self from reason, and truth from human becoming and relational personhood.

For the most part, the objective world is a partial presence in consciousness; there is so
much that we do not know about. Such unknowing produces fear. In other words, the
world is not only present by way of knowledge, ideas and imagination, but also through
fear. We know that the self is both in relation to itself and the world. Yet, the extent to
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which the relation is governed by being conscious ‘of something’ is the extent to which
the self remains caught in its own possibilities and fears (the Heideggerian care for
Being). This suggests four points. First, every act of consciousness is a search for the
presence of meaning. Second, every act of consciousness is also a relation and response
to Being, that is, the presence of things in the world (real or imaginary). Third, the act of
consciousness signifies the fears of nothingness and anxiety. Fourth, granted the self is
usually centred on its own possibilities, fears and desires, the act of consciousness
grounds experience as objective in the sense of making it ‘mine’. We can begin to see a
pattern in which the conscious self responds to the presence of other things in the world
by objectifying them in a possessive and egoistic way. Accordingly, it seems that the self
is caught up in an ontological world of knowledge, relation, fear and egoism.

The meaning of things in the world is caught up in a world of experience, knowledge and
fear. It may seem that the self is caught in a chaotic whirlwind in which there is a hunger
to search for truth. But in this hunger, the self is often swayed by the temptation not to
uncover the hidden truth of things. There are constant temptations not to think and to
hide behind the relative opinions and values of society as a whole. We fear a menacing
presence in the world: something unknown, awake and asleep, that disturbs, seeks us out
and aims at us.18 We might experience this as fear in the form of anxiety and uncertainty.
If the fear is too consuming, existence becomes shattered; we lose a sense of our personal
self. We are left with a consuming darkness that leaves the self unable to engage
normally with others.
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When fear becomes so overwhelming, we face a ‘horror of the night’: an inability to
ascertain the presence or absence of anything. In this horrible eternity, there is darkness
in and around the self that calls into question any attempt to derive meaning and truth.
The darkness creates illusion. In such an existential state of being cut off from itself, the
self undergoes a threefold altered state of existence: (i) idolisation, (ii) ethical escapism,
and (iii) terrifying and enthralling transcendence. Let us look at these states of altered
existence.

IDOLISATION
Idolisation is an illusional state that results in the depersonalisation of the self. The idol
in this case is the self’s experience: all its ideas, thoughts, imagination and fears. In this
state of being separated from reality (truth, meaning and relationship), a suffocating type
of existence takes hold. It is suffocating because any resemblance of reality ‘as such’ (as
it truly is) is rejected and blocked. In fact, existence is so suffocating that the idol (the
experience itself) shreds the self of any value.

No amount of suffering and

haemorrhaging of wounds will rupture the state of such depersonalising existence. The
self’s experience of suffering bleeds fear to such a degree that the self becomes lost,
numb and divided from reality.

Furthermore, the fears (delusions and illusions)

depersonalise the self to such a degree that the self takes an anonymous form; it becomes
‘a nothing’ in the horror of existence. What is left is the idol, the cold and heartless
experience of fear itself.
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In the darkness of existence, the self is both idol and fear. Accordingly, all ideas, thoughts
and imagination must partake in fear and idolisation; they are like servants of the idolexperience. Here, there is no role of the self. In fact, the self is but a trace to itself, lost
in darkness. Nevertheless, the idol commands a response, an overshadowing experience
that must always negate the self: its fusion with the idol. This response cannot be heard,
or seen or sensed in any way. Taking a non-personal form, we discover traces of the
response in delusions and illusions pouring into reality. These traces of horror seek to
evade ethical responsibility. The idol, having reduced the self to anonymity and anxiety,
can now aim at the good, seek it out and corrupt it with the heart of evil. Taking on a
closed and suffocating existence, idolisation is the first movement and experience of
delusion. Once it is formed like a haunting ghost in consciousness, the self is now tied to
modify the good to its delusional state of fear and horror.

ETHICAL ESCAPISM
I have tried to suggest that experience by itself is so embracing that it suffocates the
reality of the self. Accordingly, the self loses control of its ideas, thoughts and the
imagination to the idol. The idol emerges as a trace in reality as it seeks to give itself
meaning and significance by seeking out the good. But its attachment to the good is
destructive. Moving through fear and anxiety, the idol or ‘thing’ expresses itself in
relation to the good because it must hide its difference from it. Furthermore, by seeking
to relate to what is good, the-self-as-idol confuses itself with the good, and thus has found
a way paradoxically to escape the ethical life. This is because the idol dwells in the
totality of Being; it can never embrace a life of transcendence as it cannot divest itself of
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the anonymous and depersonalising nature of Being and pass over beyond towards ethical
subjectivity.

The self, consumed by the idol, not only sets out to escape the good. It also seeks to strike
at reality with its totalising presence. This is to say, for example, that delusional thoughts
and behaviours are naturally attracted to the good. But not being able to subjectively
approach the good, the idol objectifies it as an experience. The experience is so allconsuming and overwhelming that it leaves no room for the good. As a result, believing
itself to be in the realm of the good, the idol reduces the good to its presence of fear and
delusions. We can name this a state of ethical escapism because whilst the idol seeks to
merge with the good, its escapes from it by way of its hidden intent to negate (reduce) the
good to experience, namely its experience and existence of fear, horror and alienation.
Such experience necessarily finds its expression through language, behaviour and even in
the realm of transcendence.

TRANSCENDENCE
The idol that has consumed the self with fear, aimed at the good to remove itself from it,
is now ready to participate in the sacred. The experience of the sacred, as Caruana has
pointed out, can be both terrifying and enthralling.19 Yet, it is surprising that he did not
introduce the idea of death in his analysis, a theme so prevalent in Levinas’ writings.20
Moving beyond Caruana’s analysis of the sacred, we can suggest that by approaching the
sacred, the anonymous ‘thing’ (or the idol of presence and fear) seeks an enthralling and
terrifying experience above all experiences, namely the impossibility of death. This is the
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final consummation for the idol to strip subjectivity inside out. In the guise of emotional
and mystical experience, the idol is both fear and horror. In other words, the act of
participating in such a false sense of sacred transcendence – such as experiencing awe,
enthusiasm, mystery, rapture and mystical ecstasy – is an illusional state that results in
the depersonalisation of the self.21 But in saying this, I do not wish to deny a true sense
of transcendence that might also bear the effects of awe, enthusiasm, mystery, rapture and
mystical ecstasy. Given such personal encounters of the divine that animate the mind,
heart, soul and body through prayer, liturgy or having a heart for the other, I would regard
these encounters as signs of transcendence, or let us say, sacred feelings, that lead us
beyond the everyday experience of our senses towards peace, mercy and justice.
Nevertheless, to distinguish between false and true transcendence is daunting, as the word
of God penetrates our existence and reality into realms beyond knowledge, experience
and presence. Perhaps, by way of exploring the very idea of death, we might discern
whether a feeling of awe, for example, is an idol experience or the very word of God.

For the idol, nothing is more enthralling and more terrifying than the impossibility of
death. This is because death is the greatest fear that ends all fears. Death is made
impossible because the idol must negate its reality and mystery. In other words, the idol
must divide the ‘experience of death’ from death itself. Granted that the idol denies the
event of death to the self, the self nevertheless experiences a death turned inside out,
namely a terrible horror of being abandoned to a solitude without end; a shadowy life of
anonymous personhood. In this sense, we can suggest that the idol is also the self turned
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inside out. Its relation to the self is one that denies the possibility for the self to die and
thus to be in a world of well-being.

We now come to realise that by seeking a terrifying state of transcendence, the idol can
more powerfully divide itself from the true self and allow its being to approach the world
with the language of fear and horror. Having no face – as the ghostly self is anonymous –
there is the impossibility of death. Whilst the self is depersonalised, the idol is free to
transforms ideas, emotions and the imagination into behaviours of fear and horror that
ultimately might become also enthralling.

The three states of altered existence emphasise that the self is vulnerable to experience in
everyday life. Any experience could overwhelm the self with trauma. We have desires
in life in which we seek to gain importance, make them good and even treat them as
sacred. But there are times when consciousness cannot always deal with experiences and
emotions. They can become exaggerated, an unwelcome excess or even an ache of woe.
Accordingly, such traumas can consume the reality of the self, turn it inside out and
throw it into an impersonal vigilance of fear and horror. To maintain such a state, the idol
of fear must not only deceive the good, but transcend the possibility of death and thus
ever deny its reality and mystery to the self. In effect, the idol prevents the self from
engaging in meaning, insight and personhood.

RESPONDING TO FEAR AND DEATH: TOWARDS COMPASSION
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I have suggested that when the self is locked in servitude to its idol-experience, it is
surrounded by fear and is denied the possibility of death. Just as the overwhelming
experiences of the self have denied the self of personhood, so we need something of
equal or even greater force that can allow the sense of self to be renewed. So far, I have
set out to describe how an all-consuming presence of experience turns the self inside out
leaving only the sheer anonymity of existence. In this eternal darkness, everything seems
lost and forsaken.

A nocturnal vigilance takes hold in which the self allows its

(ontological) lostness to ever deepen its fears. A new ‘thing’, namely the idol takes the
place of the self and commands traces of the self to evolve its imagination, reason and
consciousness into fear.

Seeking the good, the idol will never allow the self to be touched by well-being and truth.
As a result, delusions of reality create space and time for the good to be aimed at and
contaminated.

But the powerful presence of the idol (experience and fear) will

nevertheless forsake the good as it must search for a terrifying and enthralling
transcendence. The idol must convince the self that death is impossible. Only then might
it have a chance in Being to outlast the good. Towards this delusion, the idol-in-the-self
must show that the self has been divested of its personhood, leaving only traces. More
deeply, delusions and illusions of reality must continue so that experience might be truly
divided from everyday reality and a nurturing existence.

If at best we can only respond to traces of the self and moreover traces that continue to
efface the memory of the self, how then are we to respond? The idol, by its very
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depersonalising nature, seeks to make the self faceless, beyond memory and eternally
fearful. I suggest that an ethical response is to allow for a graced space and time for the
face to emerge. We need to allow ourselves not only to be faced by the fear and misery
of a poor one, but to be there for them in their loneliness, outrage and fear of the
experience of death. The idea of the face of the Other signifies exposure and evokes the
biblical themes of the love of neighbour and being made in the image of God.22

In the epiphany of the face of the Other, Levinas discerns three aspects, namely,
destitution, facing and demand. He brings them together in the following condensed
statement:

The first thing which is evident in the face of the other is this rectitude of exposure and
defenselessness. In his face, the human being is most naked, destitution itself. And at
the same time, he faces. It is a manner in which he is completely alone in his facing us
that we measure the violence perpetrated in death. Third moment of the epiphany of
the face: it makes a demand on me. The face looks at me and calls me. It lays claim
to me. 23

The first aspect of the moment of the face is the poverty of the Other. The face reveals
the nakedness and neediness of the human being. But paradoxically, the face is also nonphenomenal. This is strange because it is the naked phenomenon. To understand this
ambiguity, Levinas points out in the second moment that from within the face is the
command to be responsible, which can never be represented in consciousness. This

16
suggests that the self encounters a messianic and immemorial dimension of time in which
the Other’s destitution is exposed. In a third aspect of the epiphany of the face, the self is
confronted with a demand to be responsible to and for this Other, in a particularity that
transcends the abstractions of Being and the more routine experience of the Other. These
three aspects of the face of the Other define a sense of love for our neighbour, with the
fear for the Other’s death and solitude.

Looking at Levinas’ analysis, the face of one overwhelmed by the suffocating embrace of
presence (such as fear and anxiety turning meaning and truth into a catastrophe) seems to
me like a trace of a past. It is like a past because it has never been present to everyday
consciousness. As a trace, the face resists the presence of our judgments, experience and
critical analysis. Moreover, as trace of a past, the face signifies an ethical relation beyond
the categories of knowledge, experience and presence. We might encounter the face of
the suffering others where there is hope, that is a moment in which we can give room for
ourselves to be exposed to their fear and suffering. If obligation and responsibility
arouses inside of us, there is the possibility that we might have heard the word of God.
The face (perhaps the very word of God) is a trace of hunger for reality and a thirst for
life. Accordingly it must accuse, even traumatise and command us into responsibility. It
accuses us because we have been too late to listen to their cries and haemorrhaging of
life. It traumatises because we have never heard their cry. Finally, the face commands us
from an immemorial past of peace and mercy. In this regard, the face is the very space
and time for which the word of God to come to mind. The face demands a difficult
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freedom and a future world: a liturgy of responsibility in which no eye has seen nor ear
heard nor heart conceived (Isa. 64:4; 1 Cor 2:9).

We can begin to appreciate that the face of the poor one awakes within us, like a great
and terrible wind, graces of exposure and maternity (mercy). The Levinasian idea of
‘exposure’ depicts a state of consciousness deeply affected by the Other’s wounds,
outrage and insult. In this sense, it implies a hyperbolic passivity or vulnerability to the
Other. As Levinas explains it, ‘Here exposure has a sense radically different from
thematisation. The one is exposed to the other as a skin is exposed to what wounds it as a
cheek is offered to the smiter’.24 Such exposure is the cause and result of an acute
responsibility.

Levinas graphically describes it as a haemorrhaging for the Other.25

Ethical consciousness bleeds for the suffering Other. This kind of exposure also has
erotic overtones. Though Levinas disassociates love from eros,26 he nonetheless employs
a number of erotic ideas and images in his elaboration of the meaning of ‘exposure’.
‘Maternity’ is one such example.

Here we read, ‘Maternity, which is bearing par

excellence, bears even responsibility for the persecuting by the persecutor’.27 Levinas’
ethically modulated idea of exposure to the Other is not above using a wide range of
physical, erotic and affected-laden images.

Levinas makes a linguistic and theological connection of his notion of ‘maternity’ to the
Hebrew terms mercy (Rakhamim) and uterus (Rekhem) respectively. He recognises that
Rekhem is the origin of the word Rakhamim. It is therefore not surprising, then, that he
goes on to suggest, ‘Rakhamim is the relation of the uterus to the other, whose gestation
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takes place within it. Rakhamim is maternity itself. God as merciful is God defined by
maternity.’28
discourse.

Here we can detect a Talmudic influence on Levinas’ philosophical
He brings together the ideas and images of mercy and maternity, but

paradoxically in a context that stresses love as distinct from eros. He clarifies this by
observing that, ‘For the encounter with the face I still reserve another word: miséricorde,
mercy, when one assumes responsibility for the suffering of the other. This appears
naturally as the phenomenon of love.’29

The encounter with the Other remains

throughout a painful and difficult condition. When love is related to such all-exacting
alterity, there is little room for imaging love as an experience of erotic joy.

Both the terms, exposure and maternity, signify the extreme alterity of a life of genuine
otherness. When eros is made to surrender so completely to ethical intersubjectivity, an
outer limit of self-renunciation is presumed: the personal experiences of joy, desire and
personal taste or disposition cannot be primary in the face of the gravity of the suffering,
hunger and loneliness of the Other.30 Such an exposure to the Other’s destitution and the
necessity of bearing of the Other’s faults results in a divine comedy, a grave drama
whereby, ‘… the laughter sticks to one’s throat when the neighbour approaches – that is,
when his face, or his forsakenness, draws near’.31 In this ironic role-reversing plot of
ethical existence, God’s transcendence is shown forth in the self’s responsibility for the
Other. The ethical self can no longer refer to God through objectivity, presence and
Being, but through the self’s passivity towards the Other.32 We will now try to take our
understanding of the graces of exposure and maternity (mercy) a step further.
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Beyond the possibility of treating this Other as an experience or a theoretical idea, we are
exposed to them and, moreover, to their faces.

Through exposure, our ethical

consciousness maternally bleeds for the suffering Other; we become deeply affected by
his/her wounds, outrage and insult. What is actually taking place is first not an activity of
responsibility, but one of acute passivity and mercy. The uncaring ego in ourselves
begins to contract in which our sense of the Other moves from one of pity or even
heartlessness to compassion, having a heart and even friendship. A certain fusion occurs
between myself and the suffering reality of the Other. In this new identity of openness,
our own imperialistic ego is broken up. As a result, the Other’s fear opens a sense
responsibility. We find ourselves entering a new discourse that effaces the stigma of the
Other’s delusions and suffering. Bearing forth a language of openness, compassion and
friendship, the responsible self takes an expiatory stance.

This is no doubt a great shock or an overwhelming surprise for the self to move from a
state of objectivity to a state of passivity, that is, for the self to become a gift to the
Other.33 The objective self in its experience of the suffering Other will always seek to
treat this Other as an object, a presence in consciousness or a fact of knowledge. But the
Other is a person whose face we cannot truly know by the lens of objectivity and theory.
In contrast, the Other’s face is more an enigma exposing one to his/her suffering, wounds
and outrage. Furthermore, as an enigma, the Other’s face identifies the trace of God as
the inspiration that commands us to be responsible. Even though there will never be
enough responsibility to answer for the pain and destitution of the suffering Other, the
enigma of the face inspires a sense of expiation. We become faced by the Other’s fear of
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loneliness and death to such an extent that we begin also to bleed with them and take
responsibility for their wounds with a heart and as a friend. In this sense, we can begin to
imagine that alterity is compassion and friendship; a very donation of oneself for the
other that renews a sense of personhood.

Compassion helps us to understand that the face of the suffering Other speaks of fear and
death. Everyday experience will try to hide this reality. But, when we are exposed to the
face and its very enigma, we becomes exposed to a persecuted truth, namely that the poor
one is haemorrhaging – suffering the outrage of persecution and humiliation. Whether or
not the wound is real or delusional, any attempt to objectify it with the presence of
knowledge and experience will perhaps deepen the wound. If we are to hear the word of
God in the face of suffering others with compassion, we must develop a sense (of
transcendence) in which we listen to their fears of loneliness and death and be attentive to
them in humility even to the point of taking responsibility for their pain and those who
have grieved them. This is indeed a great burden. But what type of responsibility is
(im)possible?34

Could we not name this friendship in the sense of truly having

encountered and heard the Father’s Word in the face of the Other (Jn 15:15)?

However, as a starting point for responsibility (as friendship would be the very fruit of a
relational personhood with the other), I would suggest a compassionate discourse that
allows grief to unhold. Experiences of paranoia, delusions, disorganised thoughts and
behaviours and fear are in some ways responses to overwhelming experiences of existing
in the world. The suffering Other is a person in whom the word of God can be testified.
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But if our testimony is to be heard beyond empathy, then the Other’s pain and suffering
must also be heard. No amount of explanations (‘objectified empathy’) may help to
assuage their suffering. However, if the suffering ones know that we, perhaps like God,
are personal and with them in their pain, then there is hope that they truly might feel free
to voice their fear, pain and outrage.

The fear of death, the very fear in which the self-as-idol tries to conceal, is one which
needs to have a sacred time and space to be heard. If the suffering Other trusts and
believes that we have a heart, then there is a chance – albeit at a risk of falling into
objectifying them even with empathy – to resuscitate their lives from their world of
darkness and chaos. In the Gospels, it is not for nothing that there is silence in regards to
the experience of Holy Saturday, namely, of Christ going to the lost and God-forsaken
and of expiating for them. Likewise, Christ’s salvific action and possession of hell
teaches us to be faced by the silent fear of death. We are called and moreover
commanded to witness to such silence with compassion and a heart. Perhaps then in such
silence and witness, we might see the beginnings of grief, a crooked path to well-being,
unfolding ‘with passion’ (compassion) for the Other.

Throughout the article I have specifically set out to suggest a phenomenological and
theological perspective that may in fact be very relevant to understanding the world of
psychosis.

My major argument is that everyday experience of the world can be

overwhelming. At times, such experience becomes an idol within itself that consumes
the self, strips it of subjectivity and moreover hides the reality of death. Hence, the idol
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or ‘anonymous thing’ exists without the self, leaving only traces of the self. As the self
has become depersonalised (capitulated to the catastrophe of no-death), its traces reflect
horror and fear. Death seems impossible as the self lives out an impersonal vigilance of
darkness. But, if we believe that they are people with faces and in whom the word of
God is heard, there is hope.

At the very moment where everything seems lost, everything is possible if we can have a
heart and a sense of otherness for our suffering neighbours. Their delusions, pain and
suffering is not useless and for nothing if there is humility and a willingness to bleed and
grieve with them. This is no doubt asking too much. But when we allow for a sacred
space and time for the fear of death to express itself, we might find ourselves within a
horizon of transcendence beyond experience and objectivity. The Other’s face is an
enigma, but if we make it our desire, we can discover our heart and soul encountering the
Other’s grief and fear of death. Then perhaps, like the passivity and powerlessenss of
Christ in solidarity with the dead during Holy Saturday, we might be able to enter into the
‘nontime’ of psychosis and respond compassionately to the mystery of death and life:
Mors et vita duello.35 The mystery of Holy Saturday, especially when enhanced by the
language of alterity, offers a hope that the gift and love of compassion is possible when
all seems lost.
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